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BOOK REVIEW 
 
THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW:  
TWO VIEWS 
PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT.  By James MacGregor 
Burns.  New York: Penguin Press.  2009.  Pp. 326.  $27.95. 
 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION.  By Barry Friedman.  New York: Farrar, Straus & 
Giroux.  2009.  Pp. 614.  $35.00. 
   
Reviewed by Thomas A. Schweitzer* 
President Obama caused a stir during his second State of the 
Union Address in January 2010, when he said the following: 
With all due deference to separation of powers, last 
week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law 
that I believe will open the floodgates for special in-
terests, including foreign corporations, to spend with-
out limit in our elections.  I don’t think American elec-
tions should be bankrolled by America’s most 
powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities.  They 
should be decided by the American people.  And I’d 
urge Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill that 
helps to correct some of these problems.1 
* Professor of Law, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center of Touro College.  The author thanks 
his colleague Professor Jeffrey B. Morris, historian of federal courts, for his comments and 
suggestions. 
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He was obviously referring to Citizens United v. Federal 
Election Commission,2 decided only a week earlier, in which the Su-
preme Court’s conservative majority had struck down the McCain-
Feingold campaign finance law as unconstitutional.  At these re-
marks, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito was observed frowning, 
shaking his head, and disagreeing with the President under his 
breath.3 
Some observers thought it unfair for the President to chastise 
Justices who were members of a captive audience and precluded by 
their office from responding in kind.4  Afterward, Chief Justice Ro-
berts, who was also in attendance and targeted by the President’s re-
marks, suggested that he might absent himself from future State of 
the Union addresses.5 
While President Obama’s condemnation of a recent Supreme 
Court decision in his State of the Union speech may have been un-
precedented, at least in recent times, this confrontation was only the 
latest manifestation of a centuries-old conflict between the unelected 
Judicial Branch and the two other branches of the federal govern-
ment, the Executive and Legislative branches.6  The focus of this 
conflict is the Supreme Court’s exercise of its greatest power, the 
power to strike down a law because it is deemed inconsistent with the 
Federal Constitutio 7 
Two recent books regarding the history of the Supreme Court 
have discussed this conflict.  Packing the Court,8 by distinguished 
1 President Barack H. Obama, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State 
of the Union (Jan. 27, 2010). 
2 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
3 Jeff Shesol, Justices Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2010, at WK10. 
4 Id. 
5 Six weeks later, Chief Justice Roberts described the scene at the State of the Union 
Speech as “very troubling.”  Id.  He painted a harrowing picture of “one branch of govern-
ment standing up, literally surrounding the Supreme Court, cheering and hollering while the 
Court—according to the requirements of protocol—has to sit there expressionless.”  Id. 
6 Id. 
7 As the renowned Constitutional scholar Alexander Bickel pointed out, since judicial re-
view is “counter-majoritarian,” it constitutes “a deviant institution in American democracy.” 
BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED 
THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 259 (2009) [he-
reinafter FRIEDMAN] (citations omitted).  Friedman comments that Bickel’s concern is over-
stated for various reasons, one of which is that the majority will does not necessarily prevail 
in the modern legislative branch of government.  Id. at 259-62. 
8 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, PACKING THE COURT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
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Williams College Professor Emeritus James MacGregor Burns, de-
nounces judicial review and asserts that it has been used more often 
than not to thwart progress and the will of the majority while protect-
ing the interests of the powerful and the wealthy rather than the inter-
ests of the poor and weak in society.  In contrast, New York Univer-
sity Professor Barry Friedman, in The Will of the People,9 takes the 
view that Supreme Court decisions, over time, have tended to mirror 
the sentiments of the American people.10  This article assesses the 
two books and evaluates which account is more persuasive. 
PACKING THE COURT BY JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS 
Burns, a ninety-two year-old Political Scientist who has pub-
lished more than twenty books, has been a critic of the Supreme 
Court’s power for more than seventy years.  As a Williams College 
scholarship student who had welcomed President Franklin Roose-
velt’s landslide reelection the year before, Burns supported the Presi-
dent’s “Court-packing plan” in 1937 and was disappointed when it 
was rejected.11  This was one of the major missteps of the Roosevelt 
Administration, which aroused the opposition of not only Republi-
cans, but also many Democrats because it seemed like a blatant inter-
ference with a coordinate branch of the federal government.  The plan 
would have authorized the President to increase the number of Su-
preme Court Justices gradually.12  Eventually, this plan would have 
overcome the conservative majority which had struck down many 
new federal statutes during Roosevelt’s first term.13 
AND THE COMING CRISIS OF THE SUPREME COURT (2009) [hereinafter BURNS]. 
9 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7. 
10 The book’s subtitle indicates Friedman’s thesis. 
11 BURNS, supra note 8, at 1. 
12 The United States Constitution, Article III, Section 1 states, “The judicial power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.  Over time, 
Congress has changed the number of Justices from as few as four to as many as eleven.  The 
number of Justices has been fixed at nine since 1869.  FDR’s proposal would have entitled 
him to add an additional Justice to the Court when a Justice reached the age of 70 without 
retiring.  Just such a plan had been proposed in the 1920s by constitutional scholar Edward 
Corwin.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 217. 
13 Roosevelt’s plan was met with widespread opposition.  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 
145-49, 151.  In the end, he withdrew it, but not before changes on the Court (the retirement 
of Willis Van Devanter and the “switch in time” of Justices Owen Roberts and Charles 
Evans Hughes) produced a Court more congenial to New Deal legislation.  See id. at 151-52.  
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The impetus for FDR’s “Court-packing plan,” of course, was 
the long series of New Deal reform measures which had been struck 
down by the Supreme Court from 1933 to 1937.14  While the Ameri-
can electorate plainly voted for change in 1932, and emphatically ap-
proved FDR’s programs in his landslide reelection in 1936, many of 
the most important reforms were blocked by a phalanx of elderly Jus-
tices who had been appointed by FDR’s predecessors.15  Similar fru-
stration at the Supreme Court’s resistance to legislative change had 
motivated earlier efforts in American history to enlarge the Court so 
as to change its judicial course.16 
Both Hughes and Roberts denied that they had yielded to FDR’s pressure in what seemed 
like a major jurisprudential change on their part.  Id. at 148.  Perhaps the most blatant in-
stance of presidential pressure on the Supreme Court to reverse itself occurred in the Legal 
Tender Cases.  In 1869 the Court, with two vacancies, invalidated by a 4-3 vote a federal 
statute that provided that paper money could be used to pay debts incurred before passage of 
the act.  See Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869).  This set off a furor, and President 
Grant promptly nominated two new Justices, William Strong and Joseph Bradley, whom he 
had reason to believe would vote differently.  After they were confirmed, the Court over-
ruled Hepburn a year later in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 
93-96. 
14 BURNS, supra note 8, at 141-45. 
15 The majority included the elderly “Four Horsemen,” Willis Van Devanter, Pierce But-
ler, Joseph McReynolds, and George Sutherland.  See Elizabeth C. Price, Constitutional Fi-
delity and the Commerce Clause: A Reply to Professor Ackerman, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
139, 161 (1998).  They were usually joined by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Jus-
tice Owen Roberts.  See id. 
16 Congress changed the number of Supreme Court Justices three times during the Civil 
War and its aftermath.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 11.  This was part of its conflict with 
President Andrew Johnson, who was impeached.  The Nineteenth Century is full of exam-
ples of Congress manipulating the Supreme Court by changing the number of Justices.  In 
the 1801 Judiciary Act, which became law three weeks before Thomas Jefferson became 
president, the lame-duck Federalist Congress not only created sixteen new circuit judgeships 
(authorizing the “midnight judges,” whom outgoing President John Adams hastily ap-
pointed), but also prospectively reduced the number of Supreme Court Justices from six to 
five to deprive Jefferson of the next appointment.  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 22.  Congress 
created two new Supreme Court seats in 1837 to cement Democratic Party control of the 
Court.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 103-04.  In 1863, Congress increased the number of 
Justices to ten in order to ensure a pro-union majority.  See id. at 134.  After the assassina-
tion of President Lincoln in 1865, the Republican Congress reduced the number of Justices 
from ten to seven in order to deprive his hated successor, Andrew Johnson, of the ability to 
make appointments.  As soon as President Grant took office in 1869, Congress restored the 
number of Justices to nine.  Id.  FDR, in 1937, evoked this history in order to justify his own 
plan to authorize additional Justices (although he did not call it a “court-packing” plan).  See 
BURNS, supra note 8, at 145.  The new Republican Congress took a more radical step in 
1802 to forestall what it anticipated might be a negative Supreme Court decision on its re-
cently-enacted Repeal Act (which nullified the Circuit Judges Act): it simply cancelled the 
next term of the Supreme Court and delayed the beginning of the subsequent Term.  See 
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Burns states plainly at the outset of his book that the reason 
that the Supreme Court’s power of judicial review is not mentioned 
in the Constitution is that the Framers did not want a judicial veto in 
the hands of unelected judges.17  He concludes that it “is alien to the 
constitutional design”18 and has allowed the Supreme Court to 
“checkmat[e] the popular will[,]”19 turning the Justices into “lawgiv-
ers”20 and “politicians in robes.”21  Moreover, the fortuitous and 
anomalous consequences of “America’s biggest wheel of fortune” 
have increased over time.22  The average tenure of Supreme Court 
Justices since 1789 has been approximately fifteen years, but it has 
increased to 26 years since 1970.23  Thus, the “dead hands” of past 
presidents can influence government and cases through their long-
lived appointees decades after they have been replaced (and perhaps 
repudiated) by the electorate.24 
Burns’s freewheeling chronological history identifies several 
periods during which a conservative Court has stymied presidents’ 
programs.25  President Washington set the Supreme Court on a strong 
Federalist course when he appointed the original six Justices and later 
named an additional five to succeed those who retired or died.26  His 
successor, one-term President John Adams, appointed three Justices 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 58. 
17 BURNS, supra note 8, at 2. 
18 Id. at 255. 
19 Id. at 257. 
20 Id. at 3. 
21 Id. 
22 BURNS, supra note 8, at 4. 
23 Id. at 3-4.  See id. app. at 261-67 (listing Justices and their years of service); RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE 
§ 2.9(C) (4th ed. 2010). 
24 BURNS, supra note 8, at 4.  See id. at 144 (citing FDR’s opinion that a constitutional 
amendment should be used to “lift the Dead Hand”).  In the author’s opinion, President 
George W. Bush’s appointments of John Roberts and Samuel Alito were master strokes in 
the decades-long effort by Republican presidents to make the Supreme Court more conserva-
tive.  See id. at 239; Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court; The Most Conservative in Decades, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2010, at A1.  Because of the nominees’ intellectual brilliance, legal 
acumen, and outstanding credentials, liberal Democrats were unable to challenge their quali-
fications to join the Court.  See id.  Furthermore, they satisfied two essential attributes for 
Republican nominees: They were both extremely conservative and relatively young.  See 
David D. Kirkpatrick, In Alito, G.O.P. Reaps Harvest Planted in ’82, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2006, at A1. 
25 See BURNS, supra note 8, Contents (organizing its analysis chronologically). 
26 Id. app. at 261. 
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of similar views.27  Thus, the first two presidents got to appoint a to-
tal of fourteen Justices in twelve years while the following three Re-
publican presidents, the Virginians Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, 
only got to appoint half as many (seven) during a period more than 
twice as long (1801-1825).28  Setting a pattern which persists today, 
the Washington and Adams appointees felt no need to retire from the 
Court just because their preferred presidential candidate had been de-
feated.29  Instead, they clung to power and charted an independent 
course, frequently differing from the preferences of the new adminis-
tration.30 
John Adams’s rush to appoint “midnight judges” at the end of 
his administration led to the momentous tenure of John Marshall, 
whose brilliant decision in Marbury v. Madison31 affirmed judicial 
review and set the stage for the more than two-century-long contro-
versy which it engendered.32  In important decisions like Fletcher v. 
Peck,33 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,34 and M’Culloch v. Maryland,35 
Marshall promoted the sanctity of contracts and affirmed the primacy 
of the national government over the state governments and state 
courts.36 
As the Nineteenth Century progressed, the controversy over 
slavery increasingly came to dominate U.S. politics.37  The abolition-
ist movement grew in strength, Northern states abolished slavery, and 
the South feared for the survival of the institution.38  The political 
conflict focused on whether slavery would be preserved in the west-
ern territories as they entered the Union as states, and both the 1820 
Compromise and the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act were attempts to 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 34. 
29 Id. (noting that “Justices [appointed by Washington and Adams] clung to their seats, 
even as health or finances failed,” preventing the succeeding presidents from appointing new 
Justices).  
30 See BURNS, supra note 8, at 34-37 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s dominant influ-
ence over even Republican appointees). 
31 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
32 Id. at 177-78. 
33 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
34 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
35 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
36 See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 136; Martin, 14 U.S. at 341; M'Culloch, 17 U.S. at 420-21. 
37 BURNS, supra note 8, at 50-51. 
38 Id. 
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smooth over a national conflict over the issue.39 
In what was perhaps the Court’s most disastrous decision in 
history, Chief Justice Roger Taney’s Supreme Court evidently 
thought it was putting the issue of slavery to rest when it issued the 
Dred Scott decision in 1857.40  The result, instead, was to exacerbate 
regional conflict and to hasten the onset of the Civil War.41  Abraham 
Lincoln’s election led to the breaking point with the secession of the 
Confederate States and the outbreak of armed conflict in 1861.42  
During the conflict, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas 
corpus and authorized the roundup of tens of thousands of suspected 
Confederate sympathizers—steps which were not authorized by the 
Constitution.43  When Chief Justice Taney ordered the release from 
prison of Maryland secessionist John Merryman, Lincoln ignored the 
order and the Court was left powerless to enforce its will.44 
After the Union victory in 1865, passage of the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments promised to protect the rights 
and interests of the freedmen.45  However, in the succeeding decades, 
a conservative Court disappointed supporters of civil rights by giving 
a crabbed interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 
Slaughter-House Cases.46  As part of the deal which was made to set-
tle the disputed presidential election of 1876, the Republican Party 
agreed to withdraw federal troops from the states of the former Con-
federacy.47  A sea change occurred as the federal government gradu-
ally turned its back on Reconstruction, “Jim Crow” laws were passed, 
and the former slaveholders consolidated their control over southern 
state governments.48  A decade later, the Court minimized the scope 
of the Fourteenth Amendment when it struck down the 1875 Civil 
Rights Act, which had outlawed discrimination in public accommo-
39 Id. at 50, 56. 
40 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 56. 
41 BURNS, supra note 8, at 56, 61-62. 
42 Id. at 64. 
43 Id. at 65. 
44 Id. (noting that Justice Taney had “only the Constitution in his arsenal” and that any 
order to “haul the commander into court . . . would have been repelled by the army”). 
45 Id. at 81-83. 
46 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1872).  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 86-87. 
47 BURNS, supra note 8, at 91. 
48 Id. 
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dations like inns, coaches, and theaters.49  The gravamen of Justice 
Bradley’s decision, which ignored Congress’s clear intent to protect 
the freedmen against white-dominated southern governments, was 
that only actions by states were forbidden by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and not the acts of private businessmen.50 
For the next six decades, the Court tended to protect property 
rights and big business while showing little concern for the interests 
of the poor and underprivileged in society.51  The Court supported 
federal power and the interests of interstate railroads by striking 
down state governments’ attempts to regulate freight rates as viola-
tions of the Interstate Commerce Clause.52  Under the banner of 
“substantive due process,” the Court also struck down various legisla-
tive efforts by state governments to protect workers.53 
During the next three decades, state legislatures chafed when 
their legislative efforts to protect the welfare of workers were invali-
dated by the Court.54  Matters came to a head in the Franklin Roose-
velt Administration, when from 1933 to 1937, the Court struck down 
numerous New Deal laws on substantive due process grounds and li-
49 An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil and Legal Rights, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 
(1875), reviewed by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 8, 25 (1883).  See BURNS, supra 
note 8, at 89-90. 
50 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25.  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 89-90.  The Court 
administered its third major rebuff to black civil rights plaintiffs in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
which upheld the constitutionality of racial segregation in railroad cars and was used to justi-
fy racially segregated schools until it was overruled by Brown v. Board of Education.  163 
U.S. 537 (1896); 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 112, 183-84. 
51 BURNS, supra note 8, at 99.  In 1886, the Court handed a major gift to corporations 
when it held that a corporation was a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment which could sue to protect due process and equal protection rights.  Cnty. of 
Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 163.  
Remarkably, the Court brought about this great expansion of corporations’ constitutional 
rights without hearing any argument on the question: “The Chief Justice waved off counsel, 
telling them the [J]ustices were already decided on the issue. ‘The Court does not wish to 
hear argument on the question’ of whether the Fourteenth Amendment covers corporations, 
he said. ‘We are all of opinion that it does.’ ”  Id. (citation omitted).  Perhaps this should not 
have been surprising, coming from a Court comprised principally of former corporate law-
yers.  See BURNS, supra note 8, at 107. 
52 See, e.g., Wabash St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 563 (1886) (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3); see also BURNS, supra note 8, at 107. 
53 The classic case was Lochner v. New York, in which the Court held unconstitutional a 
New York law limiting the work week of employees in the hazardous baking business to six-
ty hours, on the grounds that this violated their freedom of contract protected by the Due 
Process Clause.  198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905). 
54 BURNS, supra note 8, at 133. 
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mited federal powers.55  When the conservative majority continued in 
this course after FDR’s blockbuster reelection in 1936,56 the exaspe-
rated President reacted with his “Court-packing plan.”57  While the 
“Court-packing plan” ultimately failed, it was largely rendered unne-
cessary by a dramatic shift in the Court in 1937 which led to more 
New Deal statutes being upheld.58  During the 1940s and 1950s, the 
Supreme Court was no longer much of a brake on Congress in large 
part because FDR eventually was able to appoint nine Justices, thus 
transforming the Court.59 
The one period in Supreme Court history which receives Pro-
fessor Burns’s unqualified approval is the Warren Court.  Burns gives 
Chief Justice Warren credit for the Court’s success in stating, “By 
making the Supreme Court a center of progressive reform, Warren 
would forge a luminous exception to the [C]ourt’s historic role as the 
bulwark of anti-democratic, anti-egalitarian conservatism.”60  Under 
Warren’s leadership, the Court ventured into such controversial areas 
as racial equality, civil liberties, criminal defendants’ rights, and vot-
ing power.61  For once, the Supreme Court, rather than acting as a 
drag on progressive forces, was actually taking a leadership role in 
protecting individual rights and liberties.  “For the first time, the Su-
preme Court was in the vanguard of change . . . .”62 
Conservatives, however, were angered rather than enthusiastic 
55 Id. at 139-45. 
56 President Roosevelt was reelected with over 60% of the popular vote, carrying all the 
states except for Maine and Vermont.  See H.W. Brands, Obama Could Take a History Les-
son from FDR’s 1936 Re-Election, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2010. 
57 BURNS, supra note 8, at 145. 
58 Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts voted to uphold federal statutes which were 
quite similar to others they had recently voted to invalidate.  See David N. Mayer, The Myth 
of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 280 (2009) (citing W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 
(1937) (upholding a minimum wage law)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks 
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act in regard to a 
small manufacturer); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (upholding the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act in regard to newspapers and press associations); Chas. C. Steward 
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding the Social Security Act's unemploy-
ment excise tax for employers); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding provi-
sions in the Social Security Act for taxes and benefits for the elderly). 
59 BURNS, supra note 8, at 157. 
60 Id. at 180. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 194. 
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about many of the Warren Court’s progressive and sometimes radical 
decisions.63  The Court was the target of furious criticism and “Im-
peach Earl Warren” signs sprouted on highways in conservative parts 
of the country.64  Other than Samuel Chase, no Supreme Court Jus-
tice has ever been impeached, and the campaign to impeach Warren 
did not succeed.65  It did, however, produce a determination on the 
part of Republicans and conservatives to move the Court t
66 
In the last few decades, the campaign to make the Court more 
conservative by Republican presidents from Nixon to George W. 
Bush has borne fruit.  As Justice Stevens observed as he left the 
Court in 2010, every new Justice appointed since 1974, the date of 
Stevens’s appointment, had been at least as conservative, if not more 
so, than his or her predecessor.67  This is largely due to the fact that 
the presidency was held by Republicans for twenty-eight of the forty 
years following 1968, and no Ju
nt from 1968 to 1993.68 
Conservatives were frustrated and disappointed when the 
Burger Supreme Court did not overturn precedents established by the 
previous Warren Court, but merely stopped the movement to the 
left.69  This was due in part to the effective rearguard action of liberal 
Justices like William Brennan and John Paul Stevens, and in part to 
Republican presidents’ nominees like Sandra Day O’Connor, David 
Souter, and Anthony Kennedy manifesting unwelcome moderation.70  
The conservative makeover of the Court finally reached real traction 
63 Id. at 193. 
64 BURNS, supra note 8, at 193. 
65 The impeachment trial of the “rabidly partisan” Federalist Justice Samuel Chase, in 
1805, was mishandled by Senate Republicans, and he was not convicted of any of the 
charges against him.  BURNS, supra note 8, at 33-34. 
66 Id. at 201-02. 
67 Adam Liptak, From Age of Independence to Age of Ideology, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
2010, at A1. 
68 Jimmy Carter was the only president to serve a full term without the opportunity to ap-
point a single Supreme Court Justice.  BURNS, supra note 8, at 211. 
69 Id. at 207. 
70 The paramount objective of most conservatives was the overruling of Roe v. Wade, 
which held that abortion was a constitutional right.  410 U.S. 113 (1973).  These three Jus-
tices, appointed by Republican presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, dashed the hopes 
of the pro-life movement when they concurred in reaffirming the central holding of Roe, al-
beit with modifications, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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O’Connor.71  The resulting Roberts Court has been aggressive in 
striking down federal statutes as unconstitutional, mimicking the 
Court during FDR’s first term.72  According to Professor Burns, dur-
ing the last two decades the Court has quietly brought about a coun-
ter-revolution in the law.73  He states: 
Over the previous two decades, the [J]ustices had un-
dertaken a remarkable but little-noticed transformation 
in their rulings on economic issues, a slow reversal of 
the “constitutional revolution” of 1937, when the 
[C]ourt had abruptly and at long last acknowledged 
the authority of the elected branches of government to 
regulate the economy.  Through a widening stream of 
pro-business decisions in such areas as environmental 
regulation, equal pay and union rights, health care and 
retirement benefits, and a host of others, the Supreme 
Court stripped power from the political branches and 
from consumers and workers and shareholders to hold 
corporations and their executives to account.  The 
[C]ourt joined the elite, turn-of-century consensus that 
trumpeted the virtues of the free market and dog-eat-
dog competition whose benefits supposedly would 
trickle down to hard-pressed working men and women 
71 The appointment of Chief Justice John Roberts, his former clerk, to succeed Chief Jus-
tice William Rehnquist, did not alter the conservative-liberal balance, since both were quite 
conservative.  BURNS, supra note 8, at 235. 
72 A new constitutional crisis could eventuate if, as now seems certain, the Supreme Court 
agrees to decide the constitutionality of the health insurance law enacted by Congress in 
March 2010 without a single Republican vote.  As this journal went to press, four federal 
district courts had ruled on the statute, whose constitutionality has been challenged in court 
by more than twenty states.  Two of them have upheld its constitutionality.  See Liberty Un-
iv., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm, 2010 WL 4860299, at *14 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 
2010) (holding that the bill was within Congress’s Commerce Clause power); Thomas More 
Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 894-95 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (upholding the law).  
Two have held it unconstitutional.  See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 WL 285683, at *22 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (holding the 
entire statute unconstitutional) (“It would be a radical departure from existing law to hold 
that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause.”); Virginia ex rel. Cucci-
nelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010) (holding the mandate that every-
one purchase medical insurance unconstitutional but severable from the rest of the statute).  
There is a real possibility that the five-vote conservative majority on the Supreme Court will 
strike down the health insurance law.  See Shesol, supra note 3. 
73 BURNS, supra note 8, at 249. 
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and impoverished families.74 
To summarize Professor Burns’s view, throughout history, the 
Supreme Court majority has often acted as a brake on progress.  Nu-
merous Justices have regarded their principal role to be to check the 
excesses of the people’s elected representatives.  Others originally 
deemed progressive have become increasingly conservative after be-
ing appointed to the Court.  This situation becomes all the more ano-
malous when Justices cling to their seats for two or three decades, 
imposing their will on the nation’s laws long after the end of the ad-
ministration of the president who appointed them. 
Burns acknowledges that “Americans have also regarded the 
Supreme Court as the ultimate guardian of their civil rights and liber-
ties, and the defender of individuals against government oppression, 
of powerless minorities against majorities.  That image . . . owes 
much to the leadership of . . . Earl Warren.”75  Yet, while “[t]he idea 
of the [C]ourt as friend to the weak and the powerless lingers[,]”76 
Burns contends that the historical reality has often been quite differ-
ent: 
Yet, as we have seen, for much of its history, the Su-
preme Court has more often been indifferent to the 
wants and needs of the great majority of Americans.  
It has wielded its supremacy over the Constitution to 
deny them economic and political power.  Too often, 
the [C]ourt has been fighting history.77 
And given the current right-wing majority and Burns’s bleak 
view of the Supreme Court’s historical record of blocking progress, 
with the notable exception of the Warren Court, this pattern is likely 
to continue in the future.78 
What, if anything, can be done about this anti-democratic 
state of affairs?  Burns notes that Roosevelt’s “Court-packing plan” 
was only the latest of numerous attempts by earlier presidents to curb 
74 Id. at 249-50. 
75 Id. at 251. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 “Americans cannot look to the judicial branch for leadership.  They cannot expect lea-
dership from unelected and unaccountable politicians in robes.”  BURNS, supra note 8, at 
252. 
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the Court’s power.79  All failed, because they never mobilized a large 
number of Americans, and amending the Constitution is a daunting 
task.  Burns makes a radical proposal—that the president simply defy 
the Court.  He states: 
Confronted by a hostile [C]ourt repeatedly striking 
down vital progressive legislation, a president could 
declare that there is no place in a modern democracy 
for unelected judges to veto twenty-first-century laws.  
The president would announce flatly that he or she 
would not accept the Supreme Court’s verdicts be-
cause the power of judicial emasculation of legislation 
was not—and never had been—in the Constitution.  
The president would invite the partisans of judicial su-
premacy to try to write that authority into the Consti-
tution by proposing a constitutional amendment. 
Through their representatives in Congress and the 
state legislatures, the American people would be given 
the choice denied them in 1803; to establish in the 
Constitution the power of judicial supremacy, or to re-
ject that power.  Only by this route could judicial rule 
be legitimated, ‘constitutionalized.’  In the meantime, 
until the matter was settled, the president would faith-
fully execute the laws the Supreme Court had uncons-
titutionally vetoed.80 
As Burns recognizes, such a bold move by a president would 
no doubt provoke a severe constitutional crisis.81  It seems certain 
that no president would dare risk such defiance of the Court.  Never-
theless, Burns believes that a determined president could ultimately 
carry this off, so that as in Britain,82 elected government officials 
79 Id. at 252. 
80 Id. at 253. 
81 Id. 
82 In the past, Britain had no entity comparable to the United States Supreme Court.  Id. at 
256.  It does have an “unwritten constitution,” which imposes limits Parliament is obliged to 
observe.  BURNS, supra note 8, at 256.  However, when Parliament passes a law, it is 
deemed constitutional.  Id.  The British government recently created a “supreme court” for 
the first time.  See Dominic Casciani, Inside the UK Supreme Court, BBC NEWS, July 15, 
2009, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8152427.stm (last visited Feb. 1, 
2011). 
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would have to define and protect the people’s interests.83  He post-
ulates that if supporters of judicial review were unable to get a consti-
tutional amendment authorizing its ratification, “the Supreme Court’s 
exclusive grip on constitutional interpretation would be broken[;]”84  
the Court would be “[s]horn of its supremacy.”85  Burns’s support for 
such a radical course is undergirded by “the fact that the Constitution 
never granted the judiciary a supremacy over the government, nor 
had the Framers ever conceived it.” 86 
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE BY BARRY FRIEDMAN 
The Will of the People, by New York University Law Profes-
sor Barry Friedman, is an in-depth and magisterial history of the Su-
preme Court armored with 202 pages of endnotes.87  Like Burns, 
Friedman introduces the subject by describing the conflict between 
FDR and the Hughes Supreme Court leading up to the 1937 crisis.88  
The book covers in exhaustive detail the Court’s exercise of judicial 
review over its lifetime, beginning with what he regards as its antece-
dents in the colonial period.89 
Friedman takes a much more favorable view of the Supreme 
Court and its decisions than Burns.  While he sometimes is critical of 
its decisions,90 his views on both the theory and practice of judicial 
83 BURNS, supra note 8, at 254-55. 
84 Id. at 254. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 253.  Burns quotes the sardonic observation of the noted constitutional scholar, 
Edward S. Corwin, during “FDR’s battle with the Hughes Court,” about the “miracle” that 
“supposes a kind of transubstantiation whereby the Court’s opinion of the Constitution . . . 
becomes the very body and blood of the Constitution.”  See id. at 255 (quoting EDWARD S. 
CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
POPULAR GOVERNMENT 68 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted).  More recent Supreme 
Courts, of course, have been no less outspoken in proclaiming their continued prerogative 
and power of judicial review.  See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516, 535-36 
(1997); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
87 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7.  The voluminous quantity of references probably explains 
why the publishers did not put them at the foot of each page, where they might overwhelm 
the text.  However, this makes the book less user-friendly, as does the small print used 
throughout the book. 
88 Id. at 3-4. 
89 Id. at 20-22 (discussing English influences during the colonial and early Revolutionary 
periods). 
90 He is especially caustic about the Court during Reconstruction, charging it with “aban-
doning blacks and embracing corporations,” although he assumes that many whites probably 
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review are quite positive.  He appears to regard the Supreme Court as 
engaged in a kind of dialogue with the American people in which 
over time, the Court’s decisions tend to respond to, and reflect, the 
views of the public.  While acknowledging that the Court in the mod-
ern era exercises more power than in the past, he states: 
The Court has this power only because, over time, the 
American people have decided to cede it to the 
[J]ustices.  The grant of power is conditional and 
could be withdrawn at any time. . . . The [J]ustices 
recognize the fragility of their position, occasionally 
they allude to it, and for the most part (though, of 
course, not entirely) their decisions hew rather closely 
to the mainstream of popular judgment about the 
meaning of the Constitution.  It is hardly the case that 
every Supreme Court decision mirrors the popular 
will—and even less so that it should.  Rather, over 
time, as Americans have the opportunity to think 
through constitutional issues, Supreme Court decisions 
tend to converge with the considered judgment of the 
American people.91 
Thus, in the rejection of FDR’s “Court-packing plan,” Fried-
man believes the American people struck a bargain with the Court 
which has come to define the modern era: 
They would support the exercise of judicial review so 
that the Court could do precisely what its New Deal 
defenders said it would—specify and enforce constitu-
tional liberties—but they would offer this support only 
so long as the Court’s decisions did not stray far, and 
for long, from the heart of what the public understood 
welcomed what he calls the “dismantling” of Reconstruction.  Id. at 138.  In contrast, he as-
serts, “The decisions in favor of business and property rights, on the other hand, were the 
product of a deliberate effort by the country’s rulers to pander to the captains of industry.” 
Id.  This pro-business bias continued, moreover, in the 1880s: “For all of the Supreme 
Court’s Reconstruction Era rhetoric about the importance of preserving the federal-state bal-
ance, in the years following Garfield’s ascension to the presidency the [J]ustices went on a 
binge of striking down state laws to protect corporate interests and property rights.” 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 160 (citing 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN 
UNITED STATES HISTORY 347 (1922)). 
91 Id. at 14. 
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the Constitution to mean.  And this, to a remarkable 
extent, is what has happened.  On issue after conten-
tious issue—abortion, affirmative action, gay rights, 
and the death penalty, to name a few—the Supreme 
Court has rendered decisions that meet with popular 
approval and find support in the latest Gallup Poll.92 
Friedman traces the antecedents of judicial review back to 
Seventeenth Century England.93  While William Blackstone94 as-
serted that Parliament possessed virtually unlimited power to make 
laws,95 Lord Chief Justice Sir Edward Coke had exercised a power 
closely resembling judicial review in Dr. Bonham’s Case in 1610.96  
The Royal College of Physicians, acting pursuant to power conferred 
on it by Parliament, fined and imprisoned Dr. Thomas Bonham for 
practicing medicine without a license.97  Since the College received 
the fine, Lord Coke ruled in favor of Dr. Bonham on the grounds that 
the law violated the basic principle that no one should be a judge in 
his own case.98  Coke asserted, “When an Act of Parliament is 
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul99 it, and adjudge such Act 
to be void.”100 
Judicial review, however, is a homegrown American product.  
According to Friedman, “This extraordinary power was a rather uni-
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 20-22. 
94 Blackstone published his four volumes of Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765 
-1769) (“Commentaries”).  It was the law book which American lawyers were most likely to 
possess at the time of the Revolution, and it greatly influenced their understanding of Eng-
lish common law.  DANIEL BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 3 (1941); 
DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 170 (1938). 
95 Describing Parliament’s vast power, Blackstone asserted that it “can . . . do everything 
that is not naturally impossible.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 21 (quoting Commentaries, 
supra note 94, at 156  (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 (Thus in the original.) 
100 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 21 (quoting Dr. Bonham’s Case, [1610] 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 
652 (K.B.)).  Britain, of course, did not have a written constitution then, nor does it have one 
now.  Does Britain Have a Written Constitution?, BRIT. EMBASSY WASH., 
http://ukinusa.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/faqs/uk-government/written-constitution (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2011).  Apparently, Lord Coke regarded the common law as a source of similar lim-
its on government power and actions.  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 21. 
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quely American innovation, emerging without plan or design in the 
period prior to the Constitutional Convention as a means of checking 
the excesses of democracy.”101  Friedman persuasively demonstrates 
that the power of the courts to strike down laws as unconstitutional 
was widely recognized in America long before Marbury.102  One 
source of the concept was widespread disgust at legislation enacted 
by the states during and after the Revolution.103  Noah Webster de-
cried “[s]o many legal infractions of sacred right—so many public 
invasions of private property—so many wanton abuses of legislative 
powers!”104  Leading New Hampshire politician William Plumer la-
mented in 1787 that “[o]ur liberties, our rights & property have be-
come the sport of ignorant unprincipled State legislators!”105  Further, 
North Carolina Attorney General James Iredell, later to become a Su-
preme Court Justice, labeled his state legislature’s work product “the 
vilest collection of trash ever formed by a legislative body.”106  James 
Madison’s notes on the “Vices of the Political System of the United 
States,” which he wrote on the eve of the Constitutional Convention, 
listed as “evils” “the multiplicity of laws, from which no State is ex-
empt.”107 
101 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 5. 
102 See id. at 27-31;  see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
3-4 (1993) (discussing judicial review proclaimed by Chief Justice Coke in 1608).  This the-
sis is shared by Lawrence Joseph Perrone.  See Lawrence Joseph Perrone, The Fundamental 
and Natural Law ‘Repugnant Review’ Origins of Judicial Review: A Synergy of Early Eng-
lish Corporate Law with Notions of Fundamental and Natural Law, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 61, 
70 (2008). 
103 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 20. 
104 Id. at 23 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing GORDON S. 
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 411 (1969)). 
105 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Letter from 
William Plumer to Daniel Tilton (Dec. 16, 1787)) (quoted in Timothy A. Lawrie, Interpreta-
tion and Authority: Separation of Powers and the Judiciary’s Battle for Independence in 
New Hampshire, 1786-1818, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 310, 318 (1995)). 
106 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Letter from 
James Iredell to Hannah Iredell (May 18, 1780), in 1 GRIFFITH J. MCREE, LIFE AND 
CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 446 (1857)). 
107 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 23.  Many of the Framers, of course, far from being demo-
crats, feared that rule by the majority would threaten property rights.  For instance, Virginia 
Governor Edmund Randolph told delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia 
in 1787 that “[o]ur chief danger arises from the democratic parts of our Constitutions. . . . 
None of the Constitutions have provided sufficient checks against the democracy.”  Id. at 24 
(alteration in original) (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 26-
27 (1911)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Property-owning qualifications for voting 
remained universal in the early United States. 
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What these leaders regarded as democratic excesses, however, 
was often enthusiastically supported by the electorate.108  Thus, the 
only realistic means of challenging legislative actions was not in sub-
sequent elections, but rather in the courts.  Friedman claims that in 
twenty state cases in the fifteen years following ratification of the 
Constitution, “at least one judge wrote a decision relying on the pow-
er to strike down legislation as unconstitutional.”109  Blackstone rec-
ognized two sources of court powers to impose checks on legisla-
tures, which resembled judicial review: the duty to resolve conflicts 
between two statutes or between two rules of law and the necessity 
that inferior courts conform to the holdings of higher courts.110 
Another reason why Americans might have found judicial re-
view congenial was their resentment at what they regarded as tyran-
nical measures by Parliament,111 which had led to the Revolution.  
The colonists justified resistance to these measures by claiming that 
they violated the constitution or higher law,112 and these were ob-
viously questions for the courts to decide.  Thus, while state supreme 
court decisions in the 1780s invalidating state laws on constitutional 
grounds naturally provoked howls of protest from legislatures and 
sometimes from the citizens, Friedman observes that the latter gener-
ally acquiesced in the results.113 
At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, 
another rationale for judicial review surfaced: a coherent and worka-
ble national government could not be formed unless its laws ultimate-
ly would take precedence over the laws of the states in cases of con-
flict.114  The Framers met this need by including the Supremacy 
Clause115 in the Constitution.  Since conflicts between state and fed-
eral laws would inevitably arise, it was obviously necessary under the 
Supremacy Clause for the Supreme Court, and other federal courts, to 
108 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 24-25. 
109 Id. at 41 (citing William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. 
L. REV. 455, 497 (2005)). 
110 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 25. 
111 For example, the use of writs of assistance by British soldiers searching for customs 
law violations, the Stamp Act of 1765, and the tax on tea.  Id. at 27-28. 
112 For instance, the Preamble of The Declaration of Independence invokes “the Laws of 
Nature and of Nature’s God.”  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
113 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 31-33. 
114 Id. at 34. 
115 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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have the power to resolve them.116  The power to declare an act of 
Congress unconstitutional was not as clearly authorized by the Con-
stitution, but in 1800, three years before Marbury, Justice Samuel 
Chase asserted that the existence of this power was generally ac-
cepted by the bar and judges.117  Friedman also argues that the First 
Congress anticipated judicial review when it enacted the Judiciary 
Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court the power to review both 
state and federal statutes.118 
Thus, it appears that Professor Friedman has conclusively 
demonstrated the existence of a strong body of opinion endorsing 
judicial review in America during the last three decades of the Eigh-
teenth Century.  Friedman concedes that this opinion was not un-
animously held, and he describes the hostile reaction of some state 
legislatures to its exercise.119  Nevertheless, the prevalent opinion 
among the legal community, even before Marbury, appears to have 
been that judicial review was necessary as a check on abuses by state 
legislatures. 
As noted above,120 James MacGregor Burns raised the ques-
tion of whether the Framers wanted the Supreme Court to have the 
power of judicial review and answered it in the negative, asserting 
that they were “meticulous men” who would not have omitted the 
subject from the Constitution through inadvertence.121  He concludes, 
“The Framers did not include a judicial veto in the Constitution be-
cause they did not want it.  They would not grant that supremacy over 
the elected branches to a nonelected judiciary.”122  He clearly implies 
that judicial review would not have existed except for John Mar-
116 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 35. 
117 Id. at 43. 
118 Id. at 42. 
119 For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Trevett v. Weeden struck down a 
state law requiring businessmen to accept paper money.  Id. at 32-33.  While many mer-
chants applauded this result, the angry legislature demanded that the judges appear before it 
and explain their decision.  Id.  After a two-month delay, the Justices finally appeared but 
refused to comment on the case, asserting that “they were accountable only to God and their 
consciences.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 32.  After the Attorney General supported the 
judges’ position, the assembly relented and released them.  Id. at 32.  There was no written 
opinion in the case, which is described in James M. Varnum, The Case, Trevett Against 
Weeden (Providence, John Carter 1787). 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 17-21. 
121 BURNS, supra note 8, at 2. 
122 Id. 
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shall’s “brilliant political coup” in the Marbury decision.123  Howev-
er, even if Burns is correct about the Framers, his account seems to 
ignore the origins of judicial review prior to Marbury and thus 
presents an incomplete historical picture.124 
Friedman divides the history of the United States Supreme 
Court into four main periods.125  During the first period, which he 
dates from the time of independence through the first decade of the 
Nineteenth Century, judicial review was widely accepted, but the 
Court was directly involved in the bitter warfare between the new 
Federalist and Republican political parties.126  During the 1790s, Fe-
deralist judges engaged in open political partisanship when prosecut-
ing Republicans under the Alien and Sedition Acts.127 
After John Adams’s defeat for reelection in 1800, the lame-
duck Federalist Congress angered the Republicans by passing the 
Circuit Judges Act.128  The statute established sixteen new federal 
judgeships, which outgoing President John Adams filled with Fede-
ralist nominees before Thomas Jefferson took office.129  A second 
statute established forty-two Justice of the Peace positions for the 
District of Columbia, and Federalist William Marbury received one 
of these appointments.130 
123 Id.  Friedman, on the other hand, states: “Despite the fame Marshall’s opinion in Mar-
bury later achieved, nothing he said on the subject of judicial review was new.”  FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 7, at 62-63.  Friedman acknowledges that Marbury represented the first instance 
in which the entire Supreme Court had declared outright that it could fail to follow an act of 
Congress, but he maintains that others like Iredell and Hamilton had said the same thing 
years earlier.  Id. 
124 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 102, at 3-4. 
125 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 12. 
126 The Constitution makes no mention of political parties, and evidently the Framers be-
lieved that the new federal government could function without them.  After President George 
Washington left office in 1797, however, the opposing political factions in the country coa-
lesced into the Federalists and the Republicans.  Id. at 46. 
127 Id. at 46-50.  Justice Samuel Chase was an intensely partisan Federalist.  After he deli-
vered what Friedman calls “a highly incendiary political grand jury charge” in Baltimore, the 
House of Representatives voted articles of impeachment against him in March 1804.  Id. at 
64-65.  After a trial in February 1805, he was acquitted, and no other United States Supreme 
Court Justice has ever been impeached.  Id. at 66-71. 
128 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 49. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 48-50.  The second statute also created a new court for the District of Co-
lumbia with three judgeships: one went to John Adams’s nephew and a second went to John 
Marshall’s brother, James.  BURNS, supra note 8, at 22.  James Marshall later served as a key 
witness for Marbury at the trial of Marbury; thus, it could be argued that Chief Justice Mar-
shall should have recused himself in the case.  Curiously, the federal reporter, Cranch, was 
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On March 4, 1801, Thomas Jefferson’s distant cousin and po-
litical adversary, newly-confirmed Chief Justice John Marshall,131 
administered the oath of office to him in an awkward ceremony fol-
lowed by Jefferson’s conciliatory inaugural address.132  The concilia-
tory mood quickly evaporated, however, as the Republicans tried to 
repeal the Circuit Judges Act and the Supreme Court issued an order 
to Secretary of State James Madison to show cause as to why he 
should not deliver a commission to newly-appointed Federalist Jus-
tice of the Peace William Marbury.133 
Two years later, the Supreme Court decided Marbury, un-
doubtedly its most important decision ever because it proclaimed the 
Court’s power of judicial review.134  Those interested in the outcome 
might not have appreciated the importance of this power, which 
would not be used to strike down Congressional statutes for many 
years.  Instead, President Jefferson’s principal reaction was a bitter 
resentment at John Marshall for lecturing and scolding him for refus-
ing to perform his duty to order the delivery of Marbury’s commis-
sion, although the Court concluded that it had no power to order the 
commission delivered because it held that the statute conferring ju-
risdiction on the Court was unconstitutional.135  Throughout the end 
of his long term as Chief Justice, John Marshall continued to promote 
federal government power at the expense of the states.136  Presidents 
Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe were frustrated by the tendency of 
Federalist Justices to linger in office, limiting their chance to appoint 
new Justices, and even more exasperating was the fact that some of 
their own Republican appointees became more sympathetic to Fede-
another nephew of John Adams (the son of Abigail Adams’s sister), and Supreme Court Jus-
tice Bushrod Washington was a nephew of George Washington, but no one seems to have 
argued that nepotism was involved.  Id. at 19. 
131 Both Jefferson and Marshall were descended from the wealthy Randolph family.  Wil-
liam Michael Treanor, Address at Touro Law Center (Apr. 2010).  While Jefferson grew up 
in a mansion, Marshall, whose Randolph grandmother had been ostracized by the family af-
ter she eloped with a plantation overseer of whom her family disapproved, grew up on the 
Virginia frontier.  Id.  He despised Jefferson for not serving in the military during the Revo-
lution, and Jefferson evidently feared Marshall.  Id. 
132 “We are all republicans.  We are all federalists . . . .”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 52. 
133 President Adams had signed the commission before leaving office March 4, but 
through an oversight it had not been delivered to Marbury.  Id. at 50. 
134 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 44. 
135 Id. at 61. 
136 Id. at 80. 
  
22 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 27 
 
ralist views after joining the Court.137 
Friedman dates the second period of the Supreme Court from 
the War of 1812 to the Nullification Crisis of 1832-33.138  During this 
period, state governments often openly defied Supreme Court deci-
sions aimed at them.139  Georgia went ahead with its removal of Che-
rokee Indians to Western areas despite Supreme Court decisions fa-
vorable to the Cherokees’ claims.140  In contrast, when South 
Carolina asserted the power to nullify federal laws with which it dis-
agreed, it was forced to comply with a federal tariff which it opposed 
when President Andrew Jackson threatened to send federal troops to 
the state to enforce the law.141 
Friedman’s third period of Supreme Court history dates from 
the Dred Scott decision142 until 1937.143  During this period, he states 
that the Supreme Court allied itself with the interests of powerful 
corporate and commercial interests.144  In the late 1800s, the Court 
favored the interstate railroads by curbing state laws setting maxi-
mum freight-carrying charges.145  After 1900, it overturned state laws 
which protected workers.146 
The fourth and final period in Friedman’s Supreme Court his-
tory is the period from 1937 to the present.147  At the outset of this 
period, the Supreme Court forestalled FDR’s “Court-packing plan” 
by making a sharp turn in its jurisprudence and subsequently uphold-
ing federal laws similar to those it had hitherto struck down.148  
While FDR’s “Court-packing plan” failed because of lack of popular 
support, he ultimately prevailed in reshaping the Court as a quite lib-
eral body by the appointment of nine Justices.149  After 1953, the 
137 Id. (recognizing that the Court enhanced the power of the federal government “with the 
bench comprised mainly of judges who were appointed by Jefferson and Madison”). 
138 Id. at 12. 
139 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 12. 
140 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 88-93. 
141 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 95-104. 
142 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393. 
143 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 13. 
144 Id. 
145 See, e.g., Wabash St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co., 118 U.S. 557. 
146 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 13. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 225-29 (“The Switch in Time that Saved Nine”). 
149 BURNS, supra note 8, at 157. 
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Warren Court greatly expanded the individual rights of criminal de-
fendants and promoted civil rights for blacks starting with its epochal 
decision in Brown v. Board of Educa 150
Following tactical missteps by Earl Warren, Abe Fortas, and 
President Lyndon Johnson, the new President Nixon had the opportu-
nity to appoint Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice Harry 
Blackmun shortly after taking office.151  His announced intent was to 
make the Court more conservative and every subsequent Republican 
presidential candidate followed suit.152  However, the results have 
been slow despite the lack of Democratic appointees.153  A Court 
with six Republican appointees issued the least conservative and 
most controversial decision of the Burger Court, Roe v. Wade,154 
which legalized abo 155 
150 347 U.S. 483. 
151 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 277-78.  Earl Warren, a longtime political adversary of Ri-
chard Nixon from their days as California politicians, offered his resignation in the summer 
of 1968, to take effect upon the appointment of a successor.  President Johnson decided to 
elevate Justice Abe Fortas, his friend from Texas, to succeed him as Chief Justice.  Id. at 
277.  The Senate was not receptive to the nomination of a liberal adviser to Johnson, and the 
nomination was withdrawn; subsequently, Fortas was forced to resign because of a financial 
scandal.  Id.  As a result, new President Nixon, to Warren’s dismay, had the opportunity to 
appoint successors to both Warren and Fortas.  Id. at 278. 
152 See generally id. at 276.  During Nixon’s 1968 presidential campaign, he advocated 
scaling back the criminal protections afforded by the Warren Court.  He famously derided 
the Court for making the public less safe when he stated, “A cab driver has been brutally 
murdered and the man that confessed the crime was let off because of a Supreme Court deci-
sion.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 276.  See also id. at 314 (taking note of Reagan’s ap-
pointment of Justices O’Connor and Scalia, and his promotion of conservative Justice Wil-
liam Rehnquist to Chief Justice, a position formerly occupied by the more moderate Warren 
Burger). 
153 See id. at 284 (observing that the Burger Court was quite liberal despite the expectation 
that it would be more conservative than the Warren Court).  President Jimmy Carter  (1977-
81) was the only president to serve a full term without the opportunity to appoint a Supreme 
Court Justice.  BURNS, supra note 8, at 211.  Between President Johnson’s appointment of 
Thurgood Marshall in 1967 and President Bill Clinton’s appointment of Ruth Bader Gins-
burg in 1993, Republican presidents got to make ten appointments (plus the elevation of Jus-
tice William Rehnquist to the post of Chief Justice).  Justice Ginsburg replaced Justice By-
ron White, the sole remaining appointee of a Democratic president on the Court, in 1993. 
154  410 U.S. 113. 
155 The decision, undoubtedly the most controversial one by the Burger Court, overturned 
the statutes of forty-six states and engendered a bitter conflict in society which has not 
ended.  Friedman cites polls from that period finding that a majority of Americans favored 
legalization of abortion in most cases, but he does not attempt to explain why only four 
states out of fifty had legalized it.  Professor John Hart Ely, who supported legislative legali-
zation of abortion rights, commented that the Roe decision “is not constitutional law and 
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 301, 354.  In 
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The Supreme Court, Friedman maintains, has become one of 
the most popular government institutions in the United States largely 
because it has closely mirrored public opinion on a series of contro-
versial subjects.156  Critics on both the left and right criticized what 
they regarded as the Court’s tendency to “split the difference”157 on 
controversial issues like abortion, with Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
often finding a middle ground between the contending sides.158  The 
result was that “the Court ran in the range of popular opinion, some-
times ahead, sometimes behind, but never far from the mainstream. 
When the Court deviated substantially, it was quickly brought into 
line.”159 
Friedman believes that such deviations, however, are merely 
temporary.  “Over time,” he concludes, “the Constitution comes to 
reflect the considered judgment of the American people regarding 
their most fundamental values.”160  “American politics has been a 
constant, unrelenting process of constitutional contestation and dis-
pute.”161  This is a positive thing because this is how constitutional 
issues are debated and decided: 
Judicial review is our invention; we created it and 
have chosen to retain it.  Judicial review has served as 
a means of forcing us to think about, and interpret, our 
Constitution ourselves. In the final analysis, when it 
subsequent years, Roe proved difficult to restrict, let alone overturn, but it provided an effec-
tive campaign issue, mostly for Republican candidates. 
156 Id. at 14-16.  Friedman comments, “But to judge by opinion polls, the Rehnquist Court 
was an extremely popular institution of government, and the public seemed well content with 
the role it was playing.”  Id. at 362.  Friedman does not believe that this had always been the 
case in earlier eras; he comments that the Court during the Civil War “was constantly in jeo-
pardy during this period, apparently because the [J]ustices were unable to read the public 
mood or unwilling to temper their actions in the face of it.”  Id. at 136. 
157 Id. at 365.  This was how conservative Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit characterized the Court’s jurisprudence. 
158 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 365.  Friedman, referring to the early Rehnquist Court, 
comments that “Justice O’Connor’s equivocation on many issues over many years proved 
very much to be a mirror of American public opinion.”  Id. at 354. 
159 Id. at 364.  Friedman “[i]magine[s] the Court as tethered to public opinion by a bungee 
cord.”  Id. at 373.  His implication is that if it moves too far out from the public, it will be 
“snapped back into line.”  Id. 
160 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 367-68.  On “big ticket issues . . . the Court seemed to be 
following cultural trends with remarkable steadfastness.”  Id. at 359.  Perhaps as a result, its 
constitutional decisions “met with broad approval from the American people.”  Id. at 322. 
161 Id. at 385. 
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comes to the Constitution, we are the highest court in 
the land.162 
THE SUPREME COURT IN PERSPECTIVE 
As the foregoing account makes clear, the economic conser-
vatism of the entrenched Supreme Court majority, which so frustrated 
FDR and led him to try to “pack the Court,” was not an exceptional 
phenomenon.  Rather, support for powerful property interests has 
marked the Court’s jurisprudence throughout its history with minor 
exceptions.163  Moreover, the institution of judicial review has played 
a critical role in promoting and protecting these interests for most of 
the Court’s history. 
As Friedman demonstrates, opposition to the democratic ex-
cesses of state legislatures during the time of the Articles of Confede-
ration led conservative supporters of property rights to support the 
idea of a judicial check on these excesses two decades before Mar-
bury.164  During his remarkable tenure as Chief Justice, John Mar-
shall enshrined the rights of contract and the economic leadership 
role of the federal government in United States constitutional law.165  
Federal power eventually triumphed over the opposing supporters of 
states’ rights in the controversies over the Bank of the United States, 
tariffs, and nullificat 166 
After the Civil War, the Supreme Court betrayed the promise 
of equality to blacks contained in the Reconstruction Amendments167 
while it fostered the power of national economic forces like the rai-
lroads over states’ attempts to regulate them.168  In 1886, the Court, 
without even hearing argument, bestowed an enormous boon on cor-
porations, greatly expanding their rights by holding that they were 
162 Id. at 385 (emphasis added). 
163 Influential economic historian Charles Beard, moreover, popularized the controversial 
thesis that the Constitution itself was written by the propertied classes to protect their inter-
ests.  CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (1913); FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 179. 
164 See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 23-25. 
165 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
166 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 79-104. 
167 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, XIV, and XV. 
168 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 161.  Congress cooperated by greatly expanding federal 
jurisdiction through the 1875 Judiciary and Removal Act, thereby affording corporations a 
preferred forum for challenging unwelcome state regulatory legislation.  Id. at 162-63. 
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“persons” with rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.169  Such pro-
business results were made more likely by the remarkable fact that no 
fewer than ten former railroad attorneys were appointed to the Su-
preme Court.170  Under the guise of freedom of contract, meanwhile, 
the Court struck down early attempts at social welfare legislation 
such as laws banning child labor and limiting workers’ hours. 171 
While the substantive due process approach has been discre-
dited by posterity, Supreme Court decisions, such as treating corpora-
tions as “persons” enjoying the full panoply of rights of persons un-
der the Fourteenth Amendment, are still taken for granted and not 
seriously questioned.  It is as if one axiom of our constitutional 
framework is a commitment to the idea that protecting business inter-
ests is generally a national interest or, as former General Motors chief 
executive Charles Wilson was reported to have stated in the 1950s, 
“What’s good for General Motors is good for the country.”172  And 
while commercial free speech rights have been treated more restric-
tively by the Supreme Court than the free speech rights of individu-
als, powerful and often anonymous economic interests took full ad-
vantage of the opportunity afforded them by the Citizens United 
decision to contribute generously to the campaigns of congenial Con-
gressional candidates in 2010.173 
No Supreme Court in history, moreover, has been less re-
strained than the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in using the power of 
judicial review to strike down federal statutes as unconstitutional.174  
169 Cnty. of Santa Clara, 118 U.S. 394.  See also supra note 51. 
170 President Ulysses Grant set the pattern; each of his appointees was a railroad attorney: 
William Strong, Joseph P. Bradley, Ward Hunt and Morrison Waite.  See generally BURNS, 
supra note 8, at 84-132.  Rutherford Hayes appointed Stanley Matthews, who was rejected 
by the Senate and re-nominated by James A. Garfield and confirmed.  Id.  Grover Cleveland 
appointed Melville Fuller.  Id.  Theodore Roosevelt appointed William Day.  Id.  William 
Howard Taft appointed Willis Van Devanter, Joseph Rucker Lamar, and Mahlon Pitney.  Id.  
Warren Harding appointed Pierce Butler.  See generally BURNS, supra note 8, at 84-132.  
Herbert Hoover appointed Owen Roberts, who had strong ties to the railroads.  Id.  FDR, 
who got to nominate nine Justices, changed this pattern: none of his nominees were railroad 
lawyers.  Id. 
171 The paradigmatic case of “substantive due process” was Lochner v. New York.  198 
U.S. 45. 
172 Wilson was misquoted: he actually had said, “for years I’ve thought what was good for 
our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa.”  Armed Forces: Engine Charlie, 
TIME, Oct. 6, 1961. 
173 See generally Bill Toland, Group Aims to Limit Flow of Cash from Companies into 
Politics, PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Oct. 5, 2010, at A-10. 
174 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 323 (“Rehnquist’s Court struck down an unprecedent-
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Certainly, the dividing line between what is constitutionally permiss-
ible and what is beyond the pale is not a bright line on which all can 
agree.  It is striking, however, that an unelected Supreme Court dom-
inated by conservatives should feel so uninhibited in rejecting legisla-
tion enacted by the people’s elected representatives.  Yet as noted 
above, Supreme Court Justices of both conservative and liberal hue 
have been quick to reassert and reaffirm their power of judicial re-
view and their exclusive right to determine what the Constitution 
means whenever the Justices feel these institutions are challenged.175 
In the contemporary period, more than two centuries after 
Marbury was decided, the institution of judicial review seems im-
pregnable.  Most Americans of varying political views appear to take 
it for granted and the Supreme Court consistently fares better than 
Congress and the President in nation-wide popularity polls.176  Yet it 
is sobering, in light of these facts, to consider the Court’s rather rocky 
jurisprudential history. 
Not all Supreme Court decisions have stood the test of time.  
Two important Supreme Court decisions in moments of national cri-
sis have been met with universal condemnation by posterity.177  Most 
observers would add Plessy v. Ferguson178 to this group.  More re-
cently, in Bush v. Gore,179 the Court, in deciding the outcome of a 
presidential election, came up with an equal protection theory which 
no constitutional scholar could have anticipated while simultaneously 
insisting that its decision would have no precedential value.180 
The Supreme Court has often been at loggerheads with the 
Executive Branch.  A number of presidents have condemned Su-
preme Court decisions issued while they were in office.181  This list 
includes Thomas Jefferson and Marbury,182 Andrew Jackson and 
Georgia’s removal of the Cherokees,183 Abraham Lincoln and Dred 
ed number of congressional laws.”).  For an example of the Roberts Court defiantly striking 
down a federal statute, see Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
175 See, e.g., Flores, 521 U.S. 507; Cooper, 358 U.S. 1. 
176 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
177 Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
178 163 U.S. 537. 
179 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
180 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 334-37. 
181 See infra notes 182-184 and accompanying text. 
182 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 60. 
183 Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.  Jackson was apocryphally reported to have said in 
response to Worcester, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”  
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Scott,184 and Theodore Roosevelt in a number of cases.185  James 
Madison, who as Secretary of State was the defendant in Marbury, 
was initially skeptical of the power of judicial review186 although he 
later came to support it.187  Reacting to New York Court of Appeals 
decisions invalidating worker protection laws on federal constitution-
al grounds, Theodore Roosevelt asserted, “It is the people, and not 
the judges, who are entitled to say what their constitution means, for 
the constitution is theirs.”188 
Presidents, moreover, have been able to bring about sharp re-
versals of stare decisis by the pressure they exert.  The two most 
dramatic instances of abrupt changes in the law under presidential 
pressure are probably the Legal Tender Cases189 and the 1937 
“switch that saved nine.”190  President George W. Bush’s brilliant 
move in appointing Justices Roberts and Alito pushed the Court to 
the right, leading to radical new constitutional holdings,191 and the 
overturning of long-standing precedents.192  With the current sharp 
political polarization in Washington, and with the Court currently be-
BURNS, supra note 8, at 44. 
184 Lincoln’s reaction to Dred Scott was that “[i]f the policy of the government, upon vital 
questions affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably fixed by the decisions of the Su-
preme Court . . . the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 
7, at 6. 
185 Id. at 167. 
186 In 1800, he “denied that ‘the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of 
the constitution.’ ”  BURNS, supra note 8, at 23.  According to Burns, Thomas Jefferson held 
a “departmentalist view of constitutional interpretation—that each branch of the government 
had an equal right to determine for itself the constitutionality of measures and actions affect-
ing its own sphere.”  Id. at 29 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
187 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 101.  Madison noted that without “the supremacy of the 
judicial power of the U.S.,” the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause would be meaningless, al-
though he contended that “ ‘the power has not always been rightly exercised.’ ”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
188 Id. at 179 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Ives v. S. Buffalo Ry. Co., 94 
N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911); In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). 
189 See Knox, 79 U.S. 457. 
190 See W. Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. 379. 
191 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 639 n.3 (2008) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing the majority opinion for failing to recognize the precedent set by United 
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), which held that unless restrictions on firearms “ha[ve] 
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we 
cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an in-
strument”). 
192 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (over-
ruling the precedent set in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 
(1911)). 
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ing divided almost evenly between five conservatives and four liber-
als, important decisions are likely to turn on fortuitous factors like the 
Justices’ health and the outcome of future presidential el
As both authors observe, of course, Justices have been known 
to change their judicial philosophy while on the Court, sometimes in 
reaction to a public outcry against their decisions.  In 1957, during 
the height of the Cold War and the ascendancy of Senator Joseph 
McCarthy of Wisconsin, the Supreme Court decided twelve civil li-
berties cases in favor of Communist defendants.193  Following the 
vehement criticism of these decisions, Justices Felix Frankfurter and 
John Marshall Harlan switched their positions and voted to uphold 
convictions in subsequent cases.194 
In another example, Justices Byron White and Potter Stewart 
joined the Supreme Court majority in declaring the death penalty un-
constitutional as applied in Furman v. Georgia,195 which was harshly 
criticized by many.196  After thirty-five state legislatures enacted new 
death penalty statutes that avoided the defects of prior laws, White 
and Stewart switched sides and upheld the new Georgia statute.197 
The most famous “switch” by Justices in response to public 
pressure was undoubtedly that of Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
and Justice Owen Roberts in 1937 during the controversy over FDR’s 
“Court-packing plan.”198  In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,199 the 
Court upheld a minimum wage law for women similar to one that it 
had held unconstitutional in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.200  A se-
ries of cases followed which rejected challenges to the constitutional-
ity of New Deal legislation.201  The defeat of FDR’s “Court-packing 
plan” is commonly ascribed to the changed votes on the Supreme 
Court, which appeared to achieve the same objective and make the 
193 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 250. 
194 Id. at 255. 
195 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“In my judgment [authorizing the 
death penalty] in these cases violated the Eighth Amendment.”). 
196 Id. at 287. 
197 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 285-88.  (“Justices Stewart and White had plainly bowed to 
intervening events.”).  Although their opinions in Furman clearly stated that they had not 
excluded the possibility that a properly drafted death penalty statute might be constitutional. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 257. 
198 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 225-29. 
199 300 U.S. 379. 
200 Id. (overruling Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). 
201 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 226. 
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plan unnecess
For Justices to change their votes in response to public pres-
sure is, however, the exception rather than the rule.  Indeed, Supreme 
Court Justices tend to regard yielding to such pressure as impropriety.  
For example, Justices O’Connor and Kennedy had expressed skeptic-
ism about the validity of Roe, and they were widely expected to vote 
to overrule it when the Court decided Planned Parenthood v. Ca-
sey.203  Instead, they voted to uphold Roe’s core holding, resisting the 
intense public pressure of anti-abortion groups.204 
As noted previously, the outcome of controversial Supreme 
Court cases sometimes depends on fortuitous circumstances such as 
the retirement or death of Justices and the victors in recent presiden-
tial elections.  Burns states, “Over the years, this judicial roulette has 
produced a jagged line of personal and political selections and made 
what might have been the most stable of branches the most unsta-
ble—as well as the most unrepresentative of all the people.”205  Per-
202 Id. at 4. 
203 505 U.S. 833. 
204 See id.  According to one student of the Court, Justice O’Connor persuaded Justices 
Souter and Kennedy to join her in claiming that stare decisis required Roe’s survival.  See 
LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 308-09 (2009).  Pro-
fessor Powe comments: 
The Republican troika (as they soon came to be labeled) . . . wrote a joint 
opinion that stood for judicial courage.  Taking the high ground, the troi-
ka stated that a decision “without principled justification would be no 
judicial act at all.”  Yet this was precisely the charge that had been le-
veled at Roe.  The troika made no attempt to demonstrate that Roe was 
principled, and if it wasn’t principled, then by their reasoning it was “no 
judicial act at all” and presumably void.  They didn’t even claim that Roe 
had been rightly decided.  They just refused to overrule it “under fire” as 
though opposition to Roe was sufficient reason to keep the decision 
alive. 
Id. at 309 (citations omitted).  The three Justices suggested that Roe was one of the cases 
where “the Court’s interpretation calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end 
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution.”  Planned 
Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 867.  Both they and Justice Scalia, who dissented, insisted that the 
Court should not be swayed by the emotional demonstrators on both sides of the controver-
sy.  See id.  Powe comments, “But the troika said that if a decision is controversial because 
so many Americans refuse to accept it, then the Court may not overrule it. . . . The troika es-
sentially presented the nation with a [c]atch-22 scenario: if the people protest the Court will 
remain steadfast in adhering to its controversial positions; and if there is no protest, there 
would be no need to reconsider the decision.”  POWE, supra, at 312-13.  While popular oppo-
sition to a Supreme Court holding is not a valid reason to overturn it, neither is it a valid rea-
son why it must be reaffirmed. 
205 BURNS, supra note 8, at 4. 
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haps as a result, respected legal authorities have questioned the valid-
ity of judicial review over the years.  In the aftermath of the contro-
versial decision in Lochner v. New York,206 judicial review was criti-
cized by North Carolina Supreme Court Justice Walter Clark, 
Dickinson School of Law Dean William Trickett, and future Harvard 
Law School Dean Roscoe Pound.207  More recently, Professor Mark 
Tushnet proposed doing away with judicial review altogether208 and 
other liberal law professors have reconsidered their support for judi-
cial review after the Supreme Court’s recent turn to the right.209 
As previously noted, Professor Friedman maintains that in the 
ongoing dialogue between the Supreme Court and American public 
opinion, the Court will eventually approximate the public’s prevail-
ing views on controversial subjects.210  Given the tendency of most 
Supreme Court Justices to dig in their heels and resist public pressure 
in such instances, however, there is reason to doubt the likelihood of 
this kind of rapprochement.  Many Supreme Court decisions, like 
other cases, have quite technical holdings that the public would not 
understand even if, as is unlikely, laymen actually took time to read 
them.  Even when substantive legal issues are squarely presented by a 
case’s fact pattern, the public, lacking a legal education, cannot be 
expected to have an intelligent legal opinion about such issues.  As 
Friedman himself acknowledges, it seems that pluralism usually ben-
efits only powerful organized interests.211  The record of Congress 
and regulatory agencies demonstrates that powerful vested interests 
“with an ax to grind” often prevail over the diffuse public interest be-
cause the general population lacks the time and ability to focus on a 
myriad of policy questions and to organize and lobby for particular 
results. 
Plainly, an ultimate authority is needed in our system to rend-
er dispositive decisions on the constitutionality of state and federal 
206 198 U.S. at 64 (striking down a New York statute intended to protect the health and 
welfare of workers in the hazardous bakery industry by limiting their work week to sixty 
hours, based on the premise that it violated their due process right to enter into contracts). 
207 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 178. 
208 Id. at 345 (citing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999)). 
209 FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 345.  Friedman asserts, for instance, that Cass Sunstein 
evolved from support for an active role for judges in correcting legislative dysfunction to-
wards advocacy of a more minimalist judicial role. 
210 Id. at 16. 
211 Id. at 261 (citing THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (2d ed. 1979)). 
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laws, as the Supremacy Clause makes clear.  In light of the great 
power which is embodied in the institution of judicial review, its anti-
democratic character and the aggressive manner in which it is 
wielded by the current Supreme Court, it is perhaps surprising that it 
is merely an assumed prerogative without explicit Constitutional war-
rant.  Given the fervor with which individual Justices support posi-
tions diametrically opposed to the positions of their brethren, and 
given the record of such fatally wrong past decisions as Dred Scott, it 
seems that the Justices would be wise to manifest greater humility in 
reaching their decisions and greater awareness that they might be 
wrong.  Along with this increased recognition of their fallibility, they 
should exercise the great power of judicial review with restraint and 
with greater hesitancy to set aside laws enacted by the elected repre-
sentatives of the people. 
 
 
